Link: https://ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/eth-news/news/2026/02/password-managers-less-secure-than-promised.html

• Millions of people use password managers. They make accessing online services and bank accounts easy and simplify credit card payments.
• Many providers promise absolute security – the data is said to be so encrypted that even the providers themselves cannot access it.
• However, researchers from ETH Zurich have shown that it is possible for hackers to view and even change passwords.

For people interested there were 3 cloud based password managers tested and this is what they found

The researchers demonstrated 12 attacks on Bitwarden, 7 on LastPass and 6 on Dashlane.

Is there a reason why these attacks were on cloud based pw managers?

From what I scanned, there was no reason given on why they only attacked cloud based providers.

My guess is that these are paid ones and thus have a 'market share', easier to attack etc.

If you attack a 'keepass' password the attack vector is more crypto / memory based as far as my limited knowledge goes and not some funky inbetween attack.

Also, if you attack a cloud base provides, you will most likely have multiple victims per breach / exploit, whilst offline are targeted and thus not so interesting in most cases unless we're talking about a person of interest

Copy pasting a comment that I saw on Reddit

——

Link to the original study (with a less sensationalized title):

https://zkae.io

A few important notes:

• the study is about Bitwarden, LastPass, Dashlane and 1Password. Proton Pass isn't mentioned.

• the study presumes that they're working with a malicious server (read this as compromised server, controlled by an attacker). The attacks they talk about in the article would not work on a normal server. Here's their quote:

No need to panic: all of our attacks presume a malicious server. We have no reason to believe that the password manager vendors are currently malicious or compromised, and as long as things stay that way, your passwords are safe. That said, password managers are high-value targets, and breaches do happen.

• Here's another quote, about other password managers:

You can ask your provider the following questions:

1. ⁠Do you offer end-to-end encryption? What security do you provide in case your server infrastructure were to be compromised?

1. How do you check that public keys and public-key ciphertexts are authentic?

1. How do you authenticate security-critical settings, such as the KDF type and the iteration count?

1. Do you provide integrity guarantees for a user's vault as a whole? Can a malicious server add items to your vault?

You can also ask your favourite password manager to commission an audit checking for our attacks in their products.

• If you still feel unsure/unsafe, then adopt an offline password manager (I highly recommend keepassXC).

I too recommend KeepassXC, works even on android with KeepassDX. I use syncthing to sync between devices (work, personal and android)

From the paper itself:

We had a video-conference and numerous email exchanges with Bitwarden. At the time of writing, they are well advanced in deploying mitigations for our attacks: BW01, BW03, BW11, BW12 were addressed, the minimum KDF iteration count for BW07 is now 5000, and their roadmap includes completely removing CBC-only encryption, enforcing per-item keys and changing the vault format for integrity. On 22.12.25 they shared with us a draft for a signed organisation membership scheme, which would resolve BW08 and BW09. At our request, to maintain anonymity, they have not yet credited us publicly for the disclosure, but plan to do so.

I didn't look at the response to other Password managers, but the gist here is that the article is overblowing the paper by quite a bit and the majority of the "issues" discovered are either already fixed, or active design decisions.

the paper: https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/058.pdf

Oh okay so they probably delivered malicious code to the user entering their passwords... Well even an offline pw manager can be compromised in the code.

tl;dr:

1. If the password manager server is hacked and compromised, then syncing your passwords with the compromised server will lead to compromised passwords (duh)
2. None of the providers tested have (or have had in the past) compromised servers.

and an observation or two:

• Vaultwarden is free, self-hostable, and doesn't rely on trust in a third party.
• Keepass (and its client variants, like KeepassXC which is pretty great) is even more secure because there is no server, just an encrypted file you can store anywhere.

Yes but unfortunately nothing specific about the strength of any particular option.

Is your data in KeePass encrypted?

The method, they use, requires a client-server architecture. Hence, they cannot attack a local keepass file even if you sync it to some cloud.

Assume the breach - that includes your password manager host. Especially your password manager host.

The summary is here; the linked article is a bit short on detail. https://zkae.io/

I read the summary but haven’t gotten into the details on each. It is concerning that Bitwarden has so many issues, as it’s the only one that is offered as a self hosted solution in addition to SaaS - I do think it’s unlikely for a home lab to get the kind of attention that would result in using these methods against the vault, but it’s possible. Attackers have been known to go after admins. Lastpass has had their run ins with breaches before and shouldn’t score so highly. 1Password seems to have good architecture and a responsive team.

Wish they did an assessment on Proton pass. I just started using all proton services and wanted to know how that holds up. My company uses Bitwarden 🙃

I was also just looking for bitwarden information. Its just the best password manager and has never failed to do its job.

I dont know what they mean with less secure than promised. I didnt expect them to be perfect, and havent read that they promise no security flaws.

Bitwarden have published a blog addressing this audit:

Security through transparency: ETH Zurich audits Bitwarden cryptography against malicious server scenarios

I was always (and still am) under the assumption that you are fucked anyway, if either endpoint is compromised.

Sure, you can do a lot to make it less and less comfortable to read a password.
But I’m not convinced that it is possible to. Fully prevent it from happening, no matter how hard you try.

I also use KeepassXC, and it's great. I'm interested in setting up Syncthing between my Android, Linux desktop, and NAS. Do you have any tips or articles/resources that you used to set it up?

Unfortunately they don't explain what the attacks were in the article. Gonna need to find the paper to know.

Keepass (and its client variants, like KeepassXC which is pretty great) is even more secure because there is no server, just an encrypted file you can store anywhere.

And simultaneously less secure because it's up to you to handle keeping your vault synced between various devices and most people are significantly worse at keeping systems secure than the professionals at the password managers.

Self hosting a server of some kind or using something like Keepass on a single device (with offline backups) is the most secure option, but as usual with security doing so trades significant convenience for security. For most people who are uninterested in making sure their servers are kept up to date week to week letting professionals handle it is the better option.

Hardware TOTP Authenticator & Password Manager SecureGen

Hmm, I don't think I've optimized it either to be fair. I wanted to use my phone as a 'bridge in between' but that means it uses battery since it 'checks' whats online.

In reality my phone is usually on demand and since I work from home, my work device is usually still turned on when I turn on my 'good computer' with fun projects.

One thing that I find useful is the backup / version control settings, I've set it up that there is a version control if it overwrites things so that when conflicts happen (eg a sync didn't happen and I changed both keepass databases) I can quickly 'merge' them or sync them up manually.

I've also heard that syncthing isn't available on android anymore but a fork (that is somewhat vetted, iirc) exist.

If you can run applications on your NAS & connect to it from anywhere, it could be used as a type of 'master' server that keeps everything in sync that is always online.

That's where most of the passwords are

Sure, but at the end of the day even if you don't update your vaultwarden server or you rely on an insecure storage sync system like dropbox, your actual vault is encrypted with a key that only you know. Even if your server is hacked or the kdbx is leaked, your passwords are safe until someone breaks AES.

Contrast that with hosted services, who could very easily attach their own keys to your encryption key (whether now or in the future at the behest of the state) and you'd be none the wiser. E2EE doesn't matter much when the other end is controlled by someone else.

I'm not disagreeing that most people just want something to work without thinking about, and for that reason I'm glad that services like bitwarden and lastpass and protonpass exist. My intent was not FUD, just shining a light on the fact that keeping your passwords secure does not require trusting a company.

OMFG can people please fucking go away with this stupid "password managers are worthless" bullshit today. They are exactly as secure as promised, unless you went to the obviously shady ones that use web interfaces. People have been saying this for years, if you want security, keep your password manager offline.

Interesting paper and I agree with the researchers to consider full server compromise in scope for online password managers. Maybe I missed it, but I'd have liked a section on the response by vendors. Mistakes happen, but the response and actions taken are very important for (continued) trust in a vendor.

So by that logic BitWarden is unsafe?

Russian origin?

according to recent findings, it is.

Yes, if you arent self hosting the web interface or using the desktop client.

but the gist here is that the article is overblowing the paper by quite a bit and the majority of the "issues" discovered are either already fixed, or active design decisions.

"fixed". only for new and updated passwords

https://lemmy.ml/comment/24008121

My password manager: a flat list and a little 3-liner gpg script. Has ctrl-f search feature built-in.

Sure, but at the end of the day even if you don't update your vaultwarden server or you rely on an insecure storage sync system like dropbox, your actual vault is encrypted with a key that only you know. Even if your server is hacked or the kdbx is leaked, your passwords are safe until someone breaks AES.

not really the case: https://lemmy.ml/comment/24008121

Contrast that with hosted services, who could very easily attach their own keys to your encryption key

how would official Bitwarden be able to accomplish that? apart from this vulnerability, they can't use their servers to add their own keys.

That is helpful, thank you! I will look into the master server option. I can spin up Docker containers on the NAS.

They advertise that passwords are only stored on the server in encrypted form, meaning they couldn't read them even if they wanted to (or were forced to by a government agency) and you don't have to trust them not to. This paper shows that several vulnerabilities exist in the protocol which could be exploited by malicious code running on the server (injected by hackers or a government agency), which would then allow an attacker to obtain cleartext-passwords. So you do, in fact, have to trust the servers integrity.

Thank you for taking the time to understand and comment, very valuable.

Maybe I don't know, but I liked his idea and would like to assemble it myself.

But the findings were patched before it was even published from my understanding?

But these issues were patched before even publishing the findings, right?

Let us know if you get hacked!

I'm not sure if you're asking if it is better to use the same password with 2fa, or questioning a claim that it is (which I didn't see in the article). If it's the first, no it is not better to re-use a password with 2FA.

2FA is meant to prevent someone from accessing the account if they only have your password. The problem with re-use is they can attempt that same password on other services, which may or may not support 2FA, or may have flaws in their 2FA implementation.

Also, many services will "give away" that the attacker has the right password by reacting differently if they enter the wrong password vs the right one, such as only showing the 2FA prompt if they have the right password.

Using unique passwords AND 2FA is far better, as it means an attacker must start from scratch for every service they wish to attack, and still requires compromise of your 2FA device in addition to finding out your password.

There is no way to patch the inherent flaw that comes with delivering client software through a web browser. If the entire client is delivered as a web page from a server you dont control, then that server can modify the software however it pleases. Same applies to e2ee encrypted chat clients that run as a web page like element-web (browser based matrix client).

This feels a bit extreme though. Can you even trust anything online at that point? Do you also never leave your home carrying your wallet in case someone might rob you?

Bro i have my bank details, all my private 2FA, work 2FA, health insurance access, my families master passwords, steam access, and more in there. Its literally the most important piece of software that can exist in this day and age. No im not taking chances with that. The only thing you can do with my physical wallet if you rob me is buy something up to 20€ beyond which you need the cards pin. Everything else i can just deactivate by calling the relevant parties.

But on another note, websites have never really been resistant to MITM attacks. So you dont just have to trust the hoster but also everything in between you and them.

not all of them, and some changes only apply to new passwords saved: https://lemmy.ml/comment/24008121

And simultaneously less secure because it’s up to you to handle keeping your vault synced between various devices and most people are significantly worse at keeping systems secure than the professionals at the password managers.

It is not less secure.

If the Bitwarden servers are compromised (either by hacking or by being forced to by the government of the country where they are hosted) then code could be run which would allow the attacker to receive your plaintext password and that is used to decrypt your data.

If a user is so horrible at syncing that they accidentally synced their database file to a public Twitter post, it is still protected by AES-256 which can't be broken by a simple subpoena.

In either case, syncthing is pretty simple to use and is the common recommendation for the kind of small personal file sync that you need here. It also adds an additional security layer, on top of the unbreakable AES-256 encryption, to the whole setup.

I pitty the fool that stores anything important on the cloud somebody elses computer.

These attacks can happen through server impersonation as well. The actual cloud servers need not be compromised, just the user's browser has to be. This attack can then leak passwords and allow malicious parties to even gain access on the actual cloud servers apparently.