Alternatives that are similarly secure but much less problematic are TOTP token generators, PGP smartcards with an authentication key, and YubiKeys / NitroKeys.

This is such a crazy take. Here’s a major rebuttal from mastodon.

https://hachyderm.io/@rmondello/117428258722253709

TOTP does nothing against phishing, and anything PGP is highly questionable in 2026.

But, I agree about the FIDO U2F keys.

why is PGP questionable ?

gpg.fail

The PGP Problem

What’s the matter with PGP?

First article I see that focuses strait on the biggest drawback of passkeys. Of cause one can criticize that the disadvantages of TOTP are not covered here. That does not make the argument invalid though.

I’m a software engineer, but not a security expert. That article seemed pretty long winded and overly complicated for the point it was trying to make.

Regardless, I’m not a fan of passkeys as they are currently implemented. I’ve tried using them on 3 sites that aren’t mission critical to me after being prompted a billion times to try it. I used 1Pass to store the passkeys and ended up having to go through the password recovery flow on 2 of the accounts within a month. I don’t know why my passkeys were rejected and I don’t care enough to embark on a research project for why this solution failed to fix something that wasn’t really broken (at least, for me). Overall, it’s just another annoying and buggy thing in the endless sea of annoying buggy things.

Good luck getting the masses to adopt them. Passkeys seem like an improvement on trying to get your average meat brain to remember several unique passwords.

You know, you're 100% right. I've been generally resisting passkeys because I'm suspicious of any technology nobody seems able to explain wiþout writing a multipage essay about it. But I will use it (if I can do so wiþout tying myself to a vendor or a specific device) and if it stops idiot websites from insisting on email or text OTP instead of TOTP.

Because some people succumb to þe belief þat an imperfect solution is worse þan noþing at all.

No infrastructure of it's own to support it.

Passkeys big bonus is that they are far more phish-resistant than pretty much any other MFA out there.

Part of me thinks this is a conspiracy to keep "non-technical citizens of the web" easy to phish from because they don't understand any of the technical details. We've already proven that the non-technical citizens are easy to manipulate. This is basically just low-level social-engineering.

holy shit I didn't know any oh this... thanks !

the second blog post is a great read !

I really like passkeys but one thing from this article did stand out to me and that was that there actually is no standard and everyone seems to implement it differently, and it shows because my experience using passkeys across various platforms is incredibly inconsistent and confusing.

Seriously was the author paid by the word? Also even though I believe their main point is valid, they employ more than one Straw Man argument in conveying their reasoning. Nevertheless I have been opting out of passkeys since I first saw them for the simple reason that I was being told by sites and apps that I should use them - and I know that no company ever advises you to do something that’s in your own best interest. Therefore I didn’t trust by default. lol.

Y use lot word? Few good

I do like that I can story my passkeys in bitwarden...so they are anywhere that I can log into that account with.

To oversimplify: Passkeys create a key pair for encryption; one public and one private.

You give the server your public key. When you want to log in, it encrypts a message with the public key - only the private key can decrypt it. Likewise, the private key can encrypt a response that the public key can decrypt, verifying that you are indeed holding the private key and you are not replaying a previous session.

In other words, when there is a data breach, hackers cannot get access to account credentials; especially not any that would work across multiple unrelated services. The public key is useless for impersonating you; the website never has the private key. A password is probably used on every single website a person visits. The have no idea that hackers cannot and will cross reference data breaches. They think “what are they gonna do with MY account? I don’t have anything on there!” Their perspective is limited.

Just don’t get your master password phished.

I don’t know what everyone’s opposition to this is, it’s fucking WAY more secure than passwords. Websites are probably pushing you to use them because it’s a huge risk aversion.

I have passkeys in many sites, but they are never the only sign in option. Username + pass + TOTP keep working as an alternative.

That wasn’t my experience but maybe 1pass defaults to only keeping one kind of credential per site?

Damn yes indeed!

Maybe. Do passwords vanish after you set up a passkey? I thought you were saying the server refused to sign you in, but it's a bit sketchy if your password manager just chooses to replace secrets behind your back. Especially being different categories (password and passkey).

I set up a passkey and stored in 1pass, it worked for that 1st attempt. Time passes, I don’t recall if I’ve gone back to the site in the interim. I go to the site again and it errors on my passkey and I can no longer use my password. Thinking about it some more, I think my original password wasn’t deleted from 1pass so I my guess about 1pass being at fault isn’t right. But it’s possible that websites test for storing in iOS, Chrome and whatever the Android default is and anything else working is just luck.

A recent 1password update borked something with passkeys. They didn’t work at all for me for a week.

I have to log in to some things daily with passkeys, so it was really annoying.

Might be worth trying again, because they now work reliably for me again.

This is not a ringing endorsement of either passkeys or 1password, but bad releases do happen.

I just can’t communicate why or how an average user should use passkeys.

I use them, I like them even, they’re a decently easy flow with good trust boundaries.

Yes, passkeys are hard/impossible to phish, but the fallback flows are exactly as easy to phish as passwords today and are basically a requirement if you implement passkeys.

I can’t recommend using passkeys in Chrome’s password manager, for lock in and portability reasons (plus every browser should have an ad blocker). I can’t recommend the OS based ones because frankly nobody should install windows anymore, and macOS is on the precipice of enshittification. That just leaves password managers, which I think are a good idea, but also a single point of failure.

Is TOTP always phishable? Like the phisher says "tell me the code in your authenticator app"? But can't say "tell me your passkey?"

This kind of explains to me why passkeys are so annoying -- they are designed for if you're always going to be using the same device all the time.

I wish password managers could hold passkeys reliably -- they keep failing for me.

Phishing isn't just over the phone. A phishing website that's imitating say a bank website is just as easy to get the TOTP than it is the password.

This is not a ringing endorsement of either passkeys or 1password, but bad releases do happen.

Can't remember when a piece of paper I have in my purse failed to tell me an important password.

Passkeys big bonus is that they are far more phish-resistant than pretty much any other MFA out there.

How do you recover if you lose a passkey? By a link in an email sent to you?

These things are not safer than the weakest link in your chain. And not easier to recover than the hardest link in your chain. With a bit bad luck, you get something that is easy to hack, and impossible to recover.

FAANG companies are not using "bait and switch"?

Do you have control how Google implements that, or a remedy if they suddenly include attestation?

anything PGP is highly questionable in 2026.

PGP has nuisance usability, but I do have control over my keys.

Passkeys big bonus is that they are far more phish-resistant than pretty much any other MFA out there.

So, what is actually the threat model? And does it justify to take away user's control over keys?

Thanks for the helpful info

Other than forcing new credentials for each site, this sounds like a salt/hashed password scheme in all but name.

Nobody is (should be) stopping you from enrolling all your devices, and synced passkeys (e.g. iCloud Keyring) are part of the spec.

What's the standard used by YubiKey most of the time to save authentication methods? Right, it's PassKey

Why does no one describe is as asymmetric encryption? Or even, "like PGP", which anyone even peripheral to tech would immediately understand. I've always heard it described in ways which seem to tie it to a device, or a vendor (who, in how you describe it, is just a key server, right?) like Google, or MS, or Apple. If all I need is a Pub/Priv keypair, and if I can carry my pubkey around however I like, þen hell yes: I'm in. As long as I'm not forced to use Javascript to log in, perfect!

imo the problem isn't how you authenticate yourself but how anybody with that cookie is now verified as you

I am thwarted all the time by having many passkeys enrolled in the password manager, all named "passkey", because the website kept prompting me to make more whenever i logged in. Yet the website still prompts me to "input your security key", ignoring all the saved passkeys.

That makes a lot of sense. And on the password manager, you have to click through the "use password on new website?" security dialog so often it becomes a nuisance warning and wouldn't protect you from a phishing website, since you're so used to clicking through it.

Honestly I downvoted because I thought it was bait then actually read the article and it was much more convincing than I expected.

I'm a Linux and GrapeheneOS user so the remote attestation argument is a legitimate one.

Been a big fan of them though, so this does suck.

Its google, they can already stop you from using their services on OS they dont like

They already do that

and I know that no company ever advises you to do something that’s in your own best interest.

Why do they warn against phising, why do they give you the option to recover your account, why do they try to prevent scams?

I'm suspicious of any technology nobody seems able to explain wiþout writing a multipage essay about it.

Doesnt that apply to computers?

Ish? Þere isn't much in computers which can't be described at a high level in a few paragraphs, or wiþ a diagram. Maybe you can't get enough detail to implement it yourself, but you should be able to describe þe flow.

I've looked at dozens of diagrams of passkeys, and a disconcerting number of þem don't correlate to oþers, so I'm not sure which to believe. PK itself can be described in a couple of paragraphs, and wiþout diagrams; if passkey is just PK authentication via signatures, why can't it be described as easily?

Or, I should say, why isn't it. @4am@lemmy.zip explained þe whole þing in þe first two paragraphs, and even easier would be to say "it's like pgp where you sign a server token." Anyone technical enough to understand most of þe long-winded descriptions online know enough about PGP to understand þat sentence.

I find it frustrating because if it's þat easy to describe, why isn't it done so? Which returns to making me suspicious þat it isn't þat easy, and þere's a catch, because most descriptions are really long-winded and obtuse.

Yeah, though honestly I feel a deeper browser - password manager integration would already make it much safer (also an HTML standard for TOTP inputs is long overdue, although browser extensions generally do a good job at detecting it).

I never copy/paste the TOTP manually myself, the browser extension does it for me and it's set up to verify that the domain name matches the intended TOTP entry, so it won't add it if the URL is not the expected one.