Link: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/eurasian-energy-sarma/

The global energy system has entered a period of a profound structural transformation. As the escalating war in the Middle East continues to disrupt traditional energy supply routes and, and the global geoeconomic fragmentation is reshaping trade patterns, a new Eurasian energy architecture is emerging with three pivotal actors—Russia, China, and India—forming its basis.

What initially appeared as a temporary adjustment to Western sanctions and market volatility is evolving into a deeper supply chain linking the world’s largest hydrocarbon exporter with its two fastest-growing economies.

Iran’s de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint of the global energy transportation system, has vividly underlined the urgent need for such realignment. The blockade of this vital maritime corridor, accounting for 20% of the world’s oil flows and a large volume of liquefied natural gas transportation, has triggered an unprecedent hike in oil prices, pushing Brent crude above $110 per barrel and forcing governments across Asia to reassess their energy security strategies.

For Russia, the new Middle East crisis has highlighted the strategic expediency of its ‘Turn to Asia’. For decades, Russian oil and gas flowed primarily westward to European markets, yet Moscow long foresaw the shift of the global energy demand towards Asian markets.

Speaking at the final plenary session of the 11th Valdai International Discussion Club, President Vladimir Putin underscored this logic: “…as a large part of our country is geographically in Asia, [w]hy should we not make use of our competitive advantages in this area? It would be extremely shortsighted not to do so.” The eastward reorientation of Russian trade, which began back in the late 1990s, gradually advanced through the 2000s, and accelerated after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, has produced tangible economic results. Today, a growing share of Russian oil and gas exports has moved eastward across Eurasia.

Most of Russian hydrocarbon exports redirected from Europe have been taken over by China and India: in early 2026, China accounted for about 48% of Russia’s crude exports, and India, for around 37%, which makes them by far the largest buyers of Russian oil. These figures indicate a profound structural shift.

The reorientation of supplies is supported by expanding infrastructure—from the Power of Siberia gas pipeline delivering Russian gas to China to the rapidly growing tanker routes connecting Russian Arctic and Pacific terminals with Asian refineries.

China’s role in this transformation is central. As the world’s largest energy importer, Beijing always sought to diversify supply sources to secure its growing economy from geopolitical shocks. Russian crude has become a crucial component of that strategy. In 2026, China remains the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for more than half of export revenues among Russia’s top five customers.

China has also taken precautionary measures to mitigate the risks posed by the Middle East conflict. Beijing has curbed fuel exports, and the National Development and Reform Commission has ordered refiners to prioritize domestic supplies amid external disruptions. This points to China’s concern that prolonged disruptions in the Gulf oil shipping may tighten Asian markets.

India’s position is equally significant. India is the world’s third-largest oil consumer, and its energy demand continues to expand rapidly alongside economic growth. Russian crude remains the country’s largest source of imported oil, with deliveries exceeding 1.5 million barrels per day in early 2026.
New Delhi sees the diversification of supplies not merely as a matter of commerce but also a factor of national security. Indian officials repeatedly emphasize that ensuring reliable energy supplies for more than 1.4 billion citizens is a key national priority. In this context, Russian oil—often offered under flexible pricing and transported along diversified routes—provides a valuable hedge against the Middle Eastern market volatility.

The military escalation in the Gulf has sharply reduced tanker traffic and disrupted LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz, tightening supply across Asian markets that depend heavily on Gulf producers. Analysts warn that Asia is particularly exposed to such disruptions because of its dependence on maritime energy imports from the region. The emerging Russia–India–China energy triangle is a pragmatic response to the systemic risks.

From the Russian perspective, the logic is clear. Moscow benefits from stable long-term demand for its hydrocarbons and from Asian export routes that reduce its vulnerability to Western political pressure.

Russia’s vast reserves—among the largest in the world—require sustained investment and predictable markets. Asian consumers provide precisely that combination of scale and growth.

For China, Russian supplies offer geographic and strategic advantages. Unlike Middle Eastern cargoes that must transit vulnerable maritime chokepoints, Russian energy can reach China through pipelines, Arctic shipping lanes, and relatively short maritime routes from Pacific ports. This diversification strengthens Beijing’s energy security at a time when geopolitical tensions increasingly affect global trade routes.
India’s strategy reflects similar considerations. While the Gulf will remain a key supplier, overreliance on a single region may expose India to supply shocks and price volatility.

Expanding purchases from Russia—along with growing cooperation in refining, petrochemicals, and LNG—help balance that risk while ensuring competitive pricing for Indian refiners.
Along with transforming energy flows, the energy triangle is reshaping the financial and institutional landscape of Eurasian commerce. Within BRICS, Russia, India and China have explored mechanisms for conducting energy trade in national currencies and building alternative payment systems. These initiatives reflect a broader effort to create financial infrastructure for sustained large-scale trade that could withstand global market disruptions, even during geopolitical crises.

The implications extend beyond hydrocarbons. Stable energy flows underpin industrial growth and economic stability across Eurasia, and as demand shifts towards Asia, the integration of Russian resources with Chinese and Indian markets is set to become a new normal in the 21st-century energy order.
This policy does not diminish the importance of imports from Gulf producers, but it mitigates the risk of overreliance on a single region or transit route.

What is emerging is not replacement, but rebalancing. Russian energy is increasingly complementing Middle Eastern supplies, giving China and India greater resilience against external shocks.

For Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi, the message is clear: amid global geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation, exacerbated by the U.S. and its allies’ hostile but faltering policies and internal contradictions, building diversified and resilient energy linkages is no longer optional but strategically critical.